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We describe the epidemiology and virology of the 
official length of the 2009 pandemic (68 weeks 
from April 2009 to August 2010) in the 27 European 
Union Member States plus Norway and Iceland. The 
main trends are derived from published literature as 
well as the analysis and interpretation of data pro-
vided to the European Centre for Disease Prevention 
and Control (ECDC) through the European Influenza 
Surveillance Network (EISN) and data collected by 
the ECDC itself. The 2009 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic 
started in Europe around week 16 of 2009 (although 
the World Health Organization (WHO) declared only 
in week 18). It progressed into an initial spring/
summer wave of transmission that occurred in most 
countries, but was striking only in a few, notably the 
United Kingdom. During the summer, transmission 
briefly subsided but then escalated again in early 
autumn, just after the re-opening of the schools. This 
wave affected all countries, and was brief but intense 
in most, lasting about 14 weeks. It was accompanied 
by a similar but slightly delayed wave of hospitalisa-
tions and deaths. By the time the WHO declared the 
pandemic officially over in August 2010 (week 32), 
Europe had experienced transmission at low level for 
about 34 weeks.
Objectives
This review article provides a broad epidemiological 
overview of the entire official period of 68 weeks of 
the 2009 pandemic, from week 18 (end April) 2009 to 
week 32 (mid-August) 2010, in the 27 European Union 
(EU) Member States plus Norway and Iceland (in the 
following called EU+2). It is linked to a more extensive 
document developed with the help of national surveil-
lance experts that provides further background on 
influenza epidemics and pandemics, notably their var-
iability and unpredictability [1]. The review also identi-
fies some initial lessons learnt, especially relating to 
surveillance needs in a pandemic, as discussed and 
agreed at the annual expert meeting of the European 
Influenza Surveillance Network (EISN) held in Sofia, 
Bulgaria, in June 2010 [2].
Data collection
The main surveillance trends and information presented 
here are derived from epidemiological analyses of the 
primary care and virological data (Table 1) reported 
to the European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control (ECDC)’s European Surveillance System (TESSy) 
by the European Influenza Surveillance Network (EISN; 
for more information on this network see: http://ecdc.
europa.eu/en/activities/surveillance/EISN/Pages/
home.aspx). Building on the existing reporting sys-
tems, new surveillance mechanisms were developed to 
meet additional needs for the pandemic, especially of 
capturing data on severe and fatal cases of influenza 
(Table 1). These were collected and reported in one of 
the Weekly Influenza Surveillance Overviews (WISO) 
published by ECDC during the pandemic [3,4].
Concurrently, epidemic intelligence [5] and targeted 
science watch methods (experts scan scientific jour-
nals and grey literature and summarise significant 
publications with public health relevance, significant 
developments or upcoming meetings) were employed 
to determine, as early as possible, the important 
parameters needed for risk assessment, adjusting 
projections and informing counter-measures in areas 
where the routine EU surveillance systems are less 
informative.
Early pandemic
Following its emergence in Mexico in March 2009 [6], 
the pandemic influenza A(H1N1)2009 virus appears 
to have started circulating in Europe around week 16 
of 2009, initially in travellers returning from Mexico, 
or their direct contacts (Figures 1 and 2). Early on it 
was clear that this virus met the previously agreed 
criteria for a pandemic strain (see summary at: 
http://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/H1N1/
Documents/100503_health_topics_pandemic_defini-
tion_of_a_pandemic.pdf). In response to the threat, 
EU/EEA countries started to submit detailed case-
based reports to the ECDC in May 2009, using an ad 
hoc database hosted on the secure Early Warning and 
Response (EWRS) platform. The earliest validated date 
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of onset of a European case was 19 April 2009 (week 
16). When country representatives agreed in week 
39 that central collection of case-based data was no 
longer justified, the database contained 11,275 indi-
vidual records (11,207 of which were laboratory-con-
firmed) submitted by 28 countries. A detailed analysis 
of these first cases is available elsewhere [7].
The surveillance data, supplemented by the ECDC 
epidemic intelligence and targeted science watch 
activities, helped to quantify the main pandemic 
parameters resulting in a ‘dynamic scientific risk 
assessment that was updated 10 times in 2009 as 
more information became available [8]. For exam-
ple, the reproductive number R0 for the infection was 
estimated with 95% confidence intervals between 
1.1 and 1.4 [9] (95% confidence interval) [9], a serial 
interval between 2.2 and 2.3 days [10], a mean gen-
eration time between 2.5 and 3 days [9] and a mean 
incubation period of 1.5 to 2 days. These figures are 
consistent with those found for previously circulat-
ing influenza strains [9].
There was a paucity of reliable data early on but even 
so, organisations such as the ECDC and WHO agreed 
that this was not a severe pandemic. For example, the 
ECDC interim risk assessment issued on 12 June 2009 
[8] concluded: 
“The current ECDC threat assessment for Europe is that 
the new influenza A(H1N1)v virus will continue to spread. 
Though it seems that most of those infected in the US 
and in Europe experience a mild and self-limiting infec-
tion, this picture is still unclear as there has not been 
enough transmission to judge the effects, especially in 
those more at risk.”
The pandemic waves spring/
summer and autumn/winter
Following the detection of the initial cases imported 
from North America into Europe, there was a spring and 
summer wave of transmission in Europe which affected 
most countries. Figure 1 shows the weekly percent-
age of influenza-like illness (ILI) notifications over the 
total number of reports throughout the whole report-
ing period, accumulated for all reporting countries. 
However, the wave and burden on the health services 
was only striking in very few European countries, espe-
cially the United Kingdom (UK) [11,12] and to a lesser 
extent Spain [13].Transmission subsided as the summer 
progressed, in temporal association with the closure 
of schools [12,14]. However, transmission accelerated 
again following the re-opening of the schools, this time 
affecting all countries, as an early autumn/winter wave 
started around week 43 of 2009 (Figures 1 and 3) and 
progressed from west to east across the EU. The modal 
peak week for the 24 countries consistently reporting 
their sentinel ILI consultations in the season 2009/10 
was week 48, 2009 (six countries), as opposed to week 
4, 2009 (seven countries) for the previous season 
2008/09. In most countries, the autumn/winter wave of 
disease was short and intense, lasting about 14 weeks 
and resembling the epidemic curve seen in the 1957 
pandemic in Europe [15].
A similar wave of hospitalisations and deaths followed 
soon after (Figure 4), although these data on deaths 
and especially hospitalisation are less readily availa-
ble because surveillance of severe disease attributable 
to influenza is not routine in most countries. For the 
whole pandemic period of 68 weeks (week 18, 2009 
to week 35, 2010), the EISN experts reported 925,861 
cases of ILI (25 reporting countries) and 7,202,014 
cases of acute respiratory infections (ARI) (16 report-
ing countries) attending their clinics. This is just a 
small proportion of the true number of cases in the 
Table 1
Data collected for the EU+2 Weekly Influenza Surveillance Overview
EU+2: the 27 European Union (EU) Member States plus Norway and Iceland.
a This was complemented by active monitoring of official national public health websites for announcements of deaths (see Figure 4). 
b It was not necessary to activate this element.
Source: [3].
Type of data Includes
Sentinel syndromic surveillance of influenza-like 
illness (ILI)/acute respiratory infection (ARI)
Subjective assessment of intensity and degree of geographic spread as well as reporting 
of aggregated cases
Virological surveillance
Laboratory data of the results of tests requested by sentinel physicians, and of tests done 
on non-sentinel respiratory specimens collected, describing virus type and subtype, the 
predominant strains, their antigenic and genetic characteristics and antiviral susceptibility
Hospital sentinel surveillance of severe acute 
respiratory infection (SARI)
Case-based data of the more severe forms of acute respiratory infection including 
influenza and other causes
Influenza deaths Both case-based deaths resulting from SARI and aggregated deaths reported by the countriesa
Qualitative reportingb
Planned to become the principle routine data to be collected should surveillance systems 
become overwhelmed and unable to generate the other data: includes subjective 
assessment of geographic spread, intensity, trend (as for ILI and ARI above), and impact
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Figure 1
Percentage of weekly reported sentinel ILI caseload of the overall reports, cumulated for 25 EU+2 countries, week 40, 2008–
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Figure 2
Distribution of the number of sentinel samples submitted and the percentage found positive for influenza, 28 EU+2 
countries, seasons 2008/09–2009/10 
EU+2: the 27 European Union (EU) Member States plus Norway and Iceland.
The arrow denotes the probable start of the pandemic in Europe.
Source: European Influenza Surveillance Network (EISN) reports.
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Distribution of virus types and subtypes detected from sentinel samples, seasons 2008/09 and 2009/10 in 28 EU+2 countries
EU+2: the 27 European Union (EU) Member States plus Norway and Iceland.
The arrow denotes the probable start of the pandemic in Europe.
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Officially announced and reported deaths due to pandemic influenza A(H1N1)2009 in the EU+2, by week of report, season 
2009/10
ECDC: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control; EU+2: the 27 European Union (EU) Member States plus Norway and Iceland.





































general population as the network data are collected 
from sentinel sites and not representative of the gen-
eral population. Overall rates for the EU/EEA cannot be 
estimated due to the different denominators used in 
the different countries.
The sentinel ILI and ARI networks also provide data 
on a limited number of age groups, but not on sex. All 
countries showed a consistent age distribution with 
children under the age of 14 years affected most. The 
ratio of the four age groups (under 4 years, 5–14 years, 
15–64 years and over 65 years) was: 8:5:2:1.
These figures represent only a small proportion of the 
true attack rate, i.e. those who felt unwell enough to 
attend a primary care practice that happened to be 
part of the sentinel reporting system for that coun-
try [16], and should only be used to compare with the 
figures and proportions of similar data collected in 
a normal influenza season. The proportion of those 
experiencing illness or infection differed considerably 
from what was seen outside the pandemic [17] and this 
is described in more detail elsewhere [1].
There was considerable geographic heterogeneity in 
the amount of transmission, within Europe and even 
within countries, especially in the spring/summer 
wave. While there was transmission in most countries, 
only Spain and the UK recorded a prevalence of infec-
tion high enough to produce substantial numbers of 
severely affected people [11-13]. Overall attack rates 
estimated by serology were higher than for seasonal 
influenza, although the pandemic virus affected fewer 
older persons (65 years and older), who had been 
exposed to a similar virus circulating in the 1950s and 
before [16,18]. There is clear evidence that there were 
many mild or asymptomatic cases in this pandemic, 
but whether they were more common than in the previ-
ously recorded pandemics is impossible to determine 
because it is only in this pandemic that there has been 
enough accurate seroepidemiology which combined 
with case reporting allowed such estimates to be made 
[7,12,17]. Attack rates were highest in young people, 
with country reports revealing that the highest rates 
of infection occurred in school-age children [16,18] 
and some hospital paediatric services and intensive 
care services were especially stressed [19]. There was 
also pressure on primary care services in some areas 
because attack rates exceeded what was normally 
seen with seasonal influenza. No countries reported 
any pressure on critical services outside the healthcare 
sector, which is consistent with the WHO description of 
the pandemic: this pandemic, at least in its early days, 
will be of moderate severity (statement to the press by 
WHO Director-General Dr Margaret Chan, 11 June 2009)
Virological surveillance
The pandemic influenza A(H1N1)2009 virus displaced 
the previously dominant seasonal influenza A virus 
strains in Europe, although late in both seasons 
2008/09 and 2009/10, influenza B viruses were still 
prevalent enough to cause significant disease (Figures 
2 and 3). From week 21, 2009 to week 16, 2010, 60,827 
clinical samples were submitted by the sentinel prac-
tices reporting to the EISN, of which 25,304 (41.6%) 
tested positive for influenza virus, almost all for the 
2009 pandemic virus.
All pandemic influenza A(H1N1)2009 viruses isolated 
from samples submitted by the EISN sentinel prac-
tices for testing, were found to be resistant to anti-
viral drugs in the adamantane class, but very few of 
these samples (2.5%) were found to be resistant to 
oseltamivir (Table 2). All oseltamivir-resistant strains 
were accounted for by the presence of the H275Y muta-
tion. Most of these mutations were observed follow-
ing treatment of immunocompromised patients, and 
in Europe, resistant virus was only rarely transmitted 
Table 2
Antiviral resistance by influenza virus type and subtype in samples collected by primary care sentinel networks in the 
EU+2, week 40, 2008–week 18, 2010 (n=1,454)
EU+2: the 27 European Union (EU) Member States plus Norway and Iceland; NA: not applicable, as M2 inhibitors do not act against influenza 
B viruses.
Source: European Influenza Surveillance Network (EISN) and Influenza Community Network of Reference Laboratories (CNRL) data in the 










































A(H3N2) 653 0 0 0 612 0 0 0 644  644 (100) 0 0
A(H1N1) 260  256 (98) 0 0 260 0 0 0 124  1 (1) 0 0
A(H1N1)v 424 0 1,453 37 (2.5%) 415 0 1,447 0 56  56 (100) 205 205(100%)
B 117 0 0 0 113 0 0 0 NA NA NA NA
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from one human to another unlike the seasonal influ-
enza A(H1N1) virus with the same mutation, which is 
readily transmitted [20]. Although the viruses circu-
lating during the pandemic were not identical, there 
is little evidence of significant drift or the emergence 
of dominant new variants to date [21]. A previously 
observed influenza A(H1N1)2009 variant with a D222G 
mutation has been associated with more severe dis-
ease, but it is still unclear whether this is due to a 
higher pathogenicity or a tropism for cells in the lower 
respiratory tract [21].
Mortality, severe disease and risk groups
In total, 2,900 pandemic deaths were announced by 
Member States in the first 12 months (Figure 4). This is 
probably only a proportion of the true burden of deaths 
due to the pandemic, but it remains unclear what 
that proportion is for Europe overall or for individual 
countries [22,23]. Pooling data from eight pilot coun-
tries, the EU-funded project European Monitoring of 
Excess Mortality for Public Health Action (EuroMOMO) 
detected excess all-cause mortality only in the 5-14 
year-olds in the period between weeks 27 and 51 of 
2009, compared with mortality in the previous three 
years. This estimate is probably conservative due to 
delays in reporting [24].
Before the autumn/winter wave of the pandemic, the 
EISN attempted to establish hospital-based senti-
nel surveillance of severe acute respiratory infection 
(SARI) cases, although this met with limited success 
[25]. During the autumn/winter wave, i.e. from week 
36, 2009 to week 20, 2010, 11,904 SARI cases and 
586 SARI-related fatalities were reported to ECDC 
by eleven EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
Finland, France, Ireland, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Romania, Slovakia and the United Kingdom, France 
only reported pandemic influenza A(H1N1)2009 cases 
admitted to intensive care units) [1]. Information on 
those with severe disease can be ascertained par-
tially from this data and also from focused studies in 
EU Member States [13,26].
Building on these findings, the EU Health Security 
Committee defined pregnant women, those over six 
months of age with chronic ill health and healthcare 
workers as the primary risk groups that should be 
offered immunisation against pandemic influenza 
[27,28]
Differences between the pandemic 
and seasonal influenza
The pandemic differed from the preceding influenza 
season in a number of ways (Table 3). Most notable 
was the difference in the age of those most severely 
affected. Previously, were concentrated persons aged 
65 years and older accounted for 90% of deaths from 
seasonal influenza [29,30]. In the 2009 pandemic, 
nearly 80% of the deaths reported to ECDC occurred in 
persons under 65 years [25], probably because a siz-
able proportion of older adults were protected by prior 
exposure to a similar influenza virus that had been 
circulating before the mid-1950s [16,18]. However, not 
all those older than 64 years were immune, and those 
without immunity who were infected had the highest 
case fatality rate of all age groups [25,31]. While the 
majority of deaths occurred in persons with chronic 
medical conditions, especially respiratory and neuro-
logical conditions, between 20% and 30% of the deaths 
reported in studies occurred in previously healthy indi-
viduals [31]. A considerable proportion of deaths were 
caused by acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS, 
mortality rate in 612 ARDS patients: 24.5% [25]), an 
extremely rare condition that is difficult to treat and 
that requires high dependency support for several 
weeks [32,33] One of the reasons may have been that 
the new virus has shown a tropism for receptors found 
in the alveolar epithelium of the lungs [33]. 
Serological data
To date, there has been only limited data from sero-
logical surveys. These support the surveillance data 
indicating high infection rates, but they also suggest 
higher than expected levels of asymptomatic infection 
[16,39]. While the serological findings do not allow reli-
able predictions for the influenza season 2010/11, the 
experience of the temperate countries in the southern 
hemisphere during the European summer period of 
2010 would probably provide some valuable clues.
Conclusions
The pandemic influenza A(H1N1) 2009 virus started cir-
culating in Europe around week 16 of 2009 (although 
the declared phase 5 only in week 18). It progressed into 
an initial spring/summer wave of transmission which 
occurred in most countries, but was striking only in a 
few, notably the UK. As the summer advanced, transmis-
sion briefly subsided, but then escalated again in the 
early autumn, just after the re-opening of the schools, 
this time affecting all countries. This autumn/winter 
wave was seen to progress from west to east across the 
continent. In most countries, this second wave of infec-
tion was brief but intense, lasting about 14 weeks, and 
was accompanied by a similar but slightly delayed wave 
of hospitalisations and deaths. By the time the WHO 
declared the pandemic officially over in August 2010 
(week 32, 2010), the EU+2 had experienced transmission 
at a very low level for about 34 weeks.
An excess of all-cause deaths in school-age children 
was observed. Even though this was an influenza virus 
never seen previously, prior exposure to an antigenically 
similar influenza virus circulating before the mid 1950s 
meant that many older people in Europe exhibited some 
immunity. Although many older people appeared to be 
protected, persons over the age of 65 years still had the 
highest case fatality rate of any age group.
The pandemic virus displaced the previously dominant 
seasonal influenza A viruses in Europe, although influ-
enza B viruses continued to appear at a low level late 
in the seasons. Few pandemic viruses were resistant 
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to oseltamivir, and of these, very few seemed capable 
of human-to-human transmission. Although the pan-
demic viruses are not identical, there is little evidence 
of significant drift or the emergence of dominant new 
variants to date. One variant, influenza A(H1N1)2009-
D222G has been associated with more severe disease, 
but a causative relationship has yet to be established.
Serological data suggest that there were a higher pro-
portion of mild and asymptomatic infections than in 
the preceding influenza seasons. Nevertheless, trans-
mission rates were higher than for seasonal infection 
and there were sufficient amounts of severe disease 
and notably cases of ARDS, which put a strain on 
intensive care services in many places. Young children 
(under five years of age) experienced the highest rates 
of disease, while country reports and serology indicate 
that the highest rates of infection (including asympto-
matic) were in children at school age. These high rates 
of illness presented a particular burden for primary 
services, hospital paediatric services and especially 
intensive care in some areas.
 
Pandemic planning will now need to be revisited as the 
occurrence of this pandemic does not exclude the possi-
bility of an influenza A(H5) or (H7) pandemic emerging in 
the future. The next generation of plans need to include 
more flexibility for reacting to different severity of dis-
ease and different combinations of epidemiological 
parameters. In this context it would be useful to reach 
Table 3
Comparing influenza seasons 2000/01–2008/09 with 2009 pandemic influenza
ECDC: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control; EU: European Union; EU+2: the 27 European Union (EU) Member States plus 
Norway and Iceland; EuroMOMO: project European Monitoring of Excess Mortality for Public Health Action; WHO: World Health Organization.
This table lists ten characteristics in which the new pandemic influenza differs from the ‘old’ seasonal influenza, especially as they appeared 
in more recent years (seasons 2000/01–2008/09).
Source: http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/activities/sciadvice/Lists/ECDC%20Reviews/ECDC_DispForm.aspx?List=512ff74f%2D77d4%2D4ad8%2Db6d
6%2Dbf0f23083f30&ID=911&RootFolder=%2Fen%2Factivities%2Fsciadvice%2FLists%2FECDC%20Reviews
Seasonal influenza 2000/01– 2008/09 2009 pandemic influenza 
Circulating 
influenza viruses 
Two influenza A viruses: A(H1N1) and A(H3N2), 
and some influenza B viruses; the mix varies 
with the season 
Almost exclusively the pandemic influenza A(H1N1)2009, a few 
influenza A(H3N2) viruses and increasing numbers of influenza B 
viruses towards the end of the season
When waves 
occurred 
In season,  in recent years most often starting 
after Christmas 
Started out of season with a spring/summer wave, then an early 
autumn/winter wave in Europe
Levels of 
transmission 
Variable from year to year, with local 
heterogeneity, but estimated to be 5–15% 
annually 
Hard to estimate, local heterogeneity, estimated to be over 15% 




Probably any setting where people come 
together 
Schools considered especially important, along with household 
transmission 
Experiencing 
severe disease Those in clinical risk groups and older people 
Young children, pregnant women and those in clinical risk groups; 
about 30% with severe disease were outside risk groups; many 
born before the mid-1950s were immune, but people in this 
age group who were not immune experienced severe disease 
outcomes [31] 
Premature deaths Around 90% considered to have occurred in people 65 years or older 
In confirmed reported deaths, around 80% were under 65 years 
of age 
Increase in all-cause deaths in children detected across eight EU 
countries by EuroMOMO system[24]
Mortality and 
years of potential 
life lost 
Few confirmed deaths reported each year in 
official statistics; estimates of up to 40,000 in a 
bad year using statistical methods 
Substantial numbers of confirmed deaths announced by EU+2 
Member States (n=2,900, Figure 4) but recognised to be an 
underestimate
Only estimated in one EU Member State (the Netherlands, 35 
disability-adjusted life years per 100,000 population) [35], but 





Uncommon, but recorded in many countries, even in young fit 
adults;  partially explained by the tropism of the pandemic virus 
for epithelial receptors that predominate in the alveoli of the lung, 
while the previous seasonal viruses bind best to receptors found 
predominately in the upper airways [33] 
Pathological 
findings
Viral pneumonia rare, but secondary bacterial 
infections more common in fatal cases
Fatal viral pneumonias relatively common with alveolar lining 
cells, including type I and type II pneumocytes the primarily 




Common and transmissible oseltamivir 
resistance in influenza A(H1N1) emerged in 
season 2007/08 [38]
Observed most often following antiviral treatment of susceptible 
individuals; however, as of July 2010, only transmitted very rarely 
under certain circumstances [33]; resistant seasonal influenza 
A(H1N1) seemingly displaced by the new influenza, at least for now
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a European consensus on describing and assessing the 
severity of a pandemic, and matching the response with 
the different scales and characteristics. These plans 
must also provide for the consolidation and sustain-
ability of the influenza surveillance systems that were 
introduced to meet the demands of the 2009 pandemic, 
in particular SARI, attributable mortality, and seroepi-
demiological surveillance. This surveillance work needs 
to be prioritised, given the right level of resources and 
allowed to develop and be tested during the interpan-
demic period so that the systems will be more resilient 
and effective in a future public health crisis.
At an early stage, it was appreciated that this pandemic 
was much less severe than what many European coun-
tries had feared and prepared for. This was highlighted 
in the first ECDC Risk Assessments (available at: http://
ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/H1N1/risk_threat_
assessment/Pages/risk_threat_assessment.aspx), 
WHO reports and briefings given by ECDC to national 
and European authorities. With low rates of absentee-
ism, there was also little impact on services outside the 
health sector. In conclusion this pandemic was a mild one 
for Europe [40], testing the flexibility of existing prepar-
edness plans in many countries. The greatest challenge 
during this pandemic was in the area of risk communica-
tion, as both the professionals and the general popula-
tion expected something more severe [41].
The pandemic occurred at a time when diagnostic tests 
could be made available quickly, as well as preven-
tive pharmaceutical countermeasures (antiviral drugs 
for a virus with little resistance to the neuraminidase 
inhibitors but almost complete resistance to the older 
adamantanes) and when appropriate vaccines were 
developed and made available faster than ever before. 
The occurrence of cases of ARDS when many intensive 
care units were already busy put particular pressure on 
the system without the ability to redeploy hospital staff 
internally, even though the rest of the hospitals were 
not that stressed [33]. The rapidly produced pandemic 
vaccines showed such a good immunological response 
that several formulations only required a single dose 
in adults [42]. They have also proved to be effective 
and relatively safe [42], although post-marketing sur-
veillance still needs to be maintained to determine 
exactly how safe they are and to investigate initial sig-
nals of adverse events following immunisation (AEFIs) 
[43]. There were still delays in the production of vac-
cines, so that even countries with advance purchase 
agreements received too little vaccine too late to have 
any real impact at the population level. However, the 
high vaccine efficacy and targeting of risk groups may 
have saved lives of European citizens. Where vaccines 
were made available, they were greeted with varying 
degrees of enthusiasm among health professionals. 
That these vaccines were not widely accepted was 
partly due to the difficulty in transmitting the com-
plex risk communication message. On the one hand 
the chance of severe disease following infection was 
very low unless the individual belonged to a risk group 
(young children, people with chronic ill health and 
pregnant women [33]). On the other hand, there was 
a small but real risk of severe disease and death from 
the pandemic in all healthy persons. The challenge of 
communicating this risk was considerable.
Limitations of the EU+2 data
The data used here were subject to limitations and the 
results should be interpreted with a degree of caution. 
The reported ILI or ARI surveillance data were not com-
parable between countries as there was variability in 
the data sources, size and representativeness of the net-
works. The ILI/ARI epidemic curves were also distorted 
because several countries, at different points in time, 
actively recommended that anyone with influenza-like 
symptoms should stay at home and not approach their 
primary care provider, (contrary to what the patients 
would do in a normal influenza season), thus excluding 
them being reported. In addition, there are indications 
from specialist studies that the usual patterns of seeking 
care were distorted during the pandemic and that this 
varied over time as the perception of risk changed [17].
The virological data are derived from samples sent for 
laboratory testing and confirmation. They represent 
only a selected subset of the cases, usually the more 
severely affected seeking medical help. The sentinel 
samples were representative of patients attending gen-
eral practices, while the non-sentinel samples derive 
from a varying mix of general practitioners’ diagnoses 
not included in the sentinel system and more seri-
ously affected cases that were admitted to hospital. 
Therefore the non-sentinel data were a mixture of mild 
and severe cases, which can differ by country. One 
important aspect of laboratory- based surveillance 
that was missing at the European level was routine 
seroprevalence monitoring. Although a few countries 
carried out local studies that provided valuable infor-
mation [16,18,44,45], this work was not carried out in 
a standardised and comparable manner early on in the 
pandemic. Also, the results were made available too 
late to be of use and it was not clear if the information 
they provided could be extrapolated to other countries.
The systems for collecting data on the more severe 
cases (SARI) or deaths were introduced in response to 
the pandemic, after the pandemic had already reached 
Europe. This is not the optimal time to introduce a new 
system, as the countries’ surveillance systems had to 
adapt or introduce new processes at a time when their 
resources were already stretched. There seem to be 
difficulties in capturing data on SARI cases in many 
European hospitals because it is not a diagnosis rec-
ognised by clinicians as it encompasses young children 
with bronchiolitis, older people with pneumonia and 
ARDS. Some countries found it easier to collect data on 
people hospitalised with an influenza diagnosis. Also, 
there was variability in what different sites reported as 
SARI as well as in providing reliable estimates of the 
denominators and the representativeness of the data, 
shedding doubt on the estimated rates.
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Not only reported cases were underestimated, but also 
deaths due to the 2009 pandemic influenza, especially 
in the elderly where influenza is known to be frequently 
masked by other conditions as the underlying cause of 
death [46]. Presently, only ad hoc studies can attempt 
to estimate influenza-related mortality more accu-
rately, and while such studies have been done in the 
United States [47], there have not been any in Europe
New characteristics of the 2009 
influenza pandemic 
Nevertheless, the EU/EEA surveillance data permit 
us to conclude on a number of new characteristics 
of this pandemic (Box), notably the reliance on clini-
cians to deliver the most powerful countermeasures. 
Much prominence was given to the doubts expressed 
by the professionals in some countries on the value of 
the countermeasures. Moreover, the role of the media 
in this pandemic was unprecedented and this was not 
always positive, for example when vaccine opponents 
and pandemic skeptics were given the same platform 
as expert opinions.
Lessons learnt for surveillance
The fact that the 2009 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic was 
less of a threat than what many countries had prepared 
for, tested the flexibility of existing plans. Nevertheless 
no country appears to have over-responded, while the 
systems developed by the European Commission, WHO 
and ECDC for discussing and sharing information and 
analyses proved resilient and useful. On balance, the 
EU+2 managed the response to the pandemic well [49], 
although this can be further improved. The EISN viro-
logical and primary care-based surveillance in particular 
worked well, and served to augment the data emerging 
from the ECDC epidemic intelligence and targeted science 
watch sources. Establishing surveillance in hospitals and 
sharing analyses from the first affected countries were 
less successful. It was fortunate that data and analyses 
were quickly available from North America and the south-
ern hemisphere. Lessons to be learnt include:
•	 Routine ‘severe end’ surveillance of hospitalised 
cases and deaths due to severe respiratory infection 
should be established in Europe.
•	 In the future, the process for sharing early analyses 
from the first affected countries can work better, 
possibly by increasing the faith of expert colleagues 
in the confidentiality and security of certain commu-
nication systems and the discretion of other experts 
in the country not to pass on provisional data.
•	 Much work, including research and development, 
needs to take place to make seroepidemiology avail-
able in real time.
The members of the European Influenza Surveillance 
Network (EISN) are: 
Gabriela El Belazi, Hubert Hrabcik, Peter Lachner, Reinhild 
Strauss, Robert Muchl, Theresia Popow – Kraupp, 
Monika Redlberger-Fritz, Françoise Wuillaume, Françoise 
Wuillaume, Viviane Van Casteren, Isabelle Thomas, 
Bernard Brochier, Mira Kojouharova, Rositsa Kotseva, 
Teodora Georgieva, Avraam Elia, Chryso Gregoriadou, 
Chrystalla Hadjianastassiou, Despo Pieridou Bagatzouni, 
Olga Kalakouta, Jan Kyncl, Martina Havlickova, Andreas 
Gilsdorf, Brunhilde Schweiger, Gabriele Poggensee, Gerard 
Krause, Silke Buda, Tim Eckmanns, Anne Mazick, Annette 
Hartvig Christiansen, Kåre Mølbak, Lars Nielsen, Steffen 
Glismann, Inna Sarv, Irina Dontsenko, Jelena Hololejenko, 
Natalja Njunkova, Natalia Kerbo, Olga Sadikova, Tiiu Aro, 
Amparo Larrauri, Gloria Hernandez – Pezzi, Pilar Perez – 
Brena, Rosa Cano – Portero, Markku Kuusi, Petri Ruutu, 
Thedi Ziegler, Sophie Vaux, Isabelle Bonmarin, Daniel 
Lévy-Bruhl, Bruno Lina, Martine Valette, Sylvie Van Der 
Werf, Vincent Enouf, Ian Fisher, John Watson, Joy Kean, 
Maria Zambon, Mike Catchpole, Peter Coyle, William 
F Carman, Stefanos Bonovas, Takis Panagiotopoulos, 
Sotirios Tsiodras, Ágnes Csohán, Istvan Jankovics, Katalin 
Kaszas, Márta Melles, Monika Rozsa, Zsuzsanna Molnár, 
Darina O’flanagan, Derval Igoe, Joan O’donnell, John Brazil, 
Margaret Fitzgerald, Peter Hanrahan, Sarah Jackson, Suzie 
Coughlan, Jeff Connell, Margaret Duffy, Joanne Moran, 
Professor William Hall, Arthur Löve, Gudrun Sigmundsdottir, 
Simona Puzelli, Isabella Donatelli, Maria Grazia Pompa, 
Stefania D’amato, Stefania Iannazzo, Annapina Palmieri, 
Sabine Erne, Algirdas Griskevicius, Nerija Kupreviciene, 
Rasa Liausediene, Danielle Hansen – Koenig, Joel Mossong, 
Mathias Opp, Claude P. Muller, Jacques Kremer, Patrick Hau, 
Pierre Weicherding, Antra Bormane, Irina Lucenko, Natalija 
Zamjatina, Raina Nikiforova, Charmaine Gauci, Christopher 
Barbara, Gianfranco Spiteri, Tanya Melillo, Marianne van der 
Sande, Adam Meijer, Frederika Dijkstra, Gé Donker, Guus 
Rimmelzwaan,, Simone Van Der Plas,Wim Van Der Hoek, 
Katerine Borgen, Susanne Dudman, Siri Helene Hauge, 
Olav Hungnes, Anette Kilander, Preben Aavitsland, Andrzej 
Zielinski, Lidia Brydak, Magdalena Romanowska, Malgorzata 
Sadkowska – Todys, Maria Sulik, Carlos Manuel Orta Gomes, 
Jose Marinho Falcao, Raquel Guiomar, Teresa Maria Alves 
Fernandes, Adriana Pistol, Emilia Lupulescu, Florin Popovici, 
Viorel Alexandrescu, Annika Linde, Asa Wiman, Helena 
Dahl, Malin Arneborn, Mia Brytting, Katarina Prosenc, Maja 
Socan, Katarina Prosenc, Maja Socan, Hana Blaskovicova, 
Margareta Slacikova, Mária Avdicová, Martina Molcanová, 
Šárka Kovácsová.
Box
New characteristics about the 2009 pandemic in Europe 
•	 The	first	pandemic	with	instant	communication	so	that	
early impressions (such as the experience in Mexico and 
the Ukraine) were transmitted ahead of any reasonable or 
thoughtful analysis;
•	 The	first	pandemic	that	took	place	within	the	context	of	
a set of International Health Regulations [48] and global 
governance, although essentially untried;
•	 The	first	pandemic	with	early	diagnostic	tests	which	led	
to rapid diagnosis but also an early overly strong focus by 
the media and policymakers on the numbers of infected 
people;
•	 The	first	pandemic	with	antiviral	drugs	available	which	led	
to an expectation that the pandemic might be containable 
and the invention of a containment phase by some countries
•	 The	first	pandemic	in	which	effective	countermeasures	
(antiviral drugs and vaccines) could be provided by 
clinicians, which meant the confidence of those doctors 
and nurses had to be earned and retained;
•	 The	first	pandemic	in	a	setting	with	effective	intensive	care	
and thus with a (false) expectation that everyone could be 
treated and cured;
•	 The	first	pandemic	which	received	uncontrolled	coverage	
in blogs that policy makers needed to monitor closely.
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